Worktime regulations and spousal labor supply by Goux, Dominique et al.
  
Dominique Goux, Eric Maurin, and Barbara Petrongolo 
Worktime regulations and spousal labor 
supply 
 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Goux, Dominique, Maurin, Eric and Petrongolo, Barbara (2014) Worktime regulations and 
spousal labor supply. American Economic Review, 104 (1). pp. 252-276. ISSN 0002-8282  
 
DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.1.252  
 
© 2014 American Economic Association 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/57365/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2014 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
American Economic Review 2014, 104(1): 252–276 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.1.252
252
Worktime Regulations and Spousal Labor Supply†
By Dominique Goux, Eric Maurin, and Barbara Petrongolo*
We study interdependencies in spousal labor supply by exploiting the 
design of the French workweek reduction, which introduced exog-
enous variation in one’s spouse’s labor supply, at constant earn-
ings. Treated employees work on average two hours less per week. 
Husbands of treated women respond by reducing their labor sup-
ply by about half an hour, consistent with substantial leisure com-
plementarity, and specifically cut the nonusual component of their 
workweek, leaving usual hours unchanged. Women’s response to 
their husband’s treatment is instead weak and rarely statistically 
significant, possibly due to heavier constraints in the organization of 
their workweek. (JEL J16, J22, K31)
Interdependencies in spousal labor supply have long been identified as a key 
question in the study of household behavior (Ashenfelter and Heckman 1974). 
Complementarities in labor supply and leisure within or beyond the household are 
also a key policy issue, as they represent a channel through which reforms targeted 
at specific segments of the population can ultimately affect a wider set of individu-
als. When the value of leisure time for an individual depends on the amount of lei-
sure enjoyed by her spouse, coworkers, neighbors, social contacts, etc., reforms of 
the welfare state, or tax reforms, or changes in workweek regulations aimed at some 
segments of the workforce may impact individual behavior well beyond the targeted 
population (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2006).
While interdependencies in work and leisure represent an important and contro-
versial issue, there is still little micro-level evidence on the actual magnitude of these 
effects. Progress in this direction has been limited by the difficulty of finding inde-
pendent variation in the labor supply of one’s peers, as individuals within the same 
family or social network may be subject to the same reforms, or more in general to 
correlated labor supply shocks. Another major challenge is that changes in leisure 
time and working hours are in most cases associated with important changes in earn-
ings. Thus the labor supply responses of peers cannot be interpreted as reflecting 
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pure cross-hour effects, as they may also encompass income effects. In this paper we 
exploit the unique design of the workweek reduction policy implemented in France 
in the late 1990s to overcome these issues and provide one of the very first micro 
estimates of the effect of an exogenous change in individuals’ working hours on the 
labor supply of their spouses.
In June 1998 the French socialist government mandated a reduction of the legal 
workweek, from 39 to 35 hours, to be implemented at constant monthly earnings. 
This made the legal workweek in France (by far) the shortest among OECD coun-
tries (Lee, McCann, and Messenger 2007, Table 2.4). In order to attenuate the impact 
of higher hourly wages on profitability, firms who would implement the shorter 
workweek before the relevant deadline would benefit from significant payroll tax 
cuts. Only about 300,000 firms had implemented the shorter workweek before the 
comeback of the conservative party to power in April 2002 and the interruption of 
the original reform. Nevertheless, the reform implied a noticeable change in the 
workweek of at least one spouse in over one-third of French households, with no 
direct impact on family income. Both within-household variation in the workweek 
reduction, and the absence of income effects, make the French work-sharing reform 
a unique scenario for assessing cross-hour effects within the household.
In general, it is theoretically ambiguous whether a fall in working hours and thus 
an increase in non-market time of one spouse would generate a fall or a rise in 
working hours of the other spouse. Substitutability in non-market time of husbands 
and wives could be driven by substitutable spouse efforts in home production. A 
reduction in the workweek of one spouse may shift some of her time endowment 
from market to home production, thus freeing-up some home production time of 
the other spouse, who could devote more time to market work. Conversely, if one 
detects complementarity in the non-market time of spouses, this would rather be 
consistent with complementarity of their leisure time. A reduction in the workweek 
of one spouse would increase her leisure time and thus raise the value of leisure of 
the other spouse if spouses enjoy spending time together.
This paper uses a matched worker-firm dataset obtained by combining the French 
Labor Force Survey with firm-level information on the implementation of the shorter 
workweek, in order to estimate the labor supply response of men and women to a 
reduction in the legal workweek in their spouses’ workplaces. We detect an average 
reduction of about 2 hours in the workweek of employees whose employers signed 
a workweek reduction agreement.1 When looking at spousal responses, we find that 
men tend to work about half an hour less per week when their wives become treated, 
while women’s response to their husbands’ treatment is generally weak and rarely 
significantly different from zero.
Further tests reveal that men’s labor supply response to wife treatment is not asso-
ciated with a reduction in their usual working hours, but with a reduction in the 
“nonusual” component of their workweek. Moreover, such response does not have 
a detrimental impact on their earnings, suggesting that men manage to cut on some 
form of unpaid work involvement, whether within a given day, or through an increase 
in the take-up rate of paid vacation and/or sick leave. If employees do not use their 
1 We will discuss below various reasons why the average effect of the shorter legal workweek on actual weekly 
hours is lower than the legal workweek reduction.
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whole paid leave entitlement, or do some unpaid overtime, they have some leeway 
in cutting their hours while avoiding earnings losses, and it is mostly by adjusting 
around these unpaid work margins that men respond to shorter workweek agreements 
in their wives’ firms. Under the assumption that the workweek reduction in wives’ 
firms affects their husbands only via wives’ labor supply, we provide an instrumental 
variable estimate of the average cross-hour effect for husbands of 0.23, rising to 0.34 
for managers and professionals, and to 0.59 for fathers of young children.
Our paper builds on a long strand of literature on family labor supply, investigating 
the response of an individual’s labor supply to independent changes in her spouse’s 
income and/or hours of work. These changes may in turn be driven by events as diverse 
as retirement, job loss, or fiscal reforms. Several studies document the positive associ-
ation between husbands’ and wives’ retirement decisions, over and above what would 
be predicted by correlation in age and incentives in the retirement system (Blau 1998; 
Gustman and Steinmeier 2000). Conversely, the added worker effect literature detects 
mild substitutability between the labor supply of spouses, as married women tend to 
increase their working hours following husbands’ job loss (Lundberg 1985; Cullen and 
Gruber 2000). More recently, Gelber (forthcoming) exploits the Swedish tax reform of 
1990–1991 to examine own earnings’ responses to changes in the marginal tax rate for 
one’s spouse, and shows that as spousal earnings rise, own earnings rise too. Insofar 
as earnings responses reflect labor supply responses, these findings suggest comple-
mentarity in spousal leisure. Complementarity is also detected by Hamermesh (2002), 
who finds that spouses’ daily work schedules are more synchronized than would occur 
randomly. While building on very different sources of variation, these papers agree in 
documenting important spillovers in the labor supply of spouses.
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, independent variation in spousal 
hours of work at constant earnings allows us to obtain cross-hour effects that are not 
confounded by income effects. In particular, under the assumption that an employee’s 
workweek regulations affect their spouses only via their labor supply, we can identify 
the presence of leisure complementarity in the utility functions of spouses. Second, 
while previous work has mostly focused on the labor supply response of secondary 
earners, we find that it is in fact men who more strongly respond to their wives’ treat-
ment, while the corresponding women’s response is much weaker. This may in turn 
be due to different degrees of leisure complementarities in the utility functions of 
spouses, or to a greater ability of men to control their working schedules. While we 
do not find compelling evidence on different preferences, the fact that women work 
shorter hours in the first place, and are less likely than men to hold managerial posi-
tions, suggests that they face relatively more binding constraints in the organization 
of their working time. Third, we provide evidence on specific adjustment margins in 
labor supply spillovers, and in particular we find that it is mostly men’s unusual, rather 
than usual, hours that are affected when their wives’ workweek is reduced.
In addition to the literature on household labor supply, our paper relates to another 
strand of the labor supply literature, investigating differences between micro and 
macro labor supply elasticities. Macroeconomic calibrations typically imply 
much larger labor supply elasticities than microeconometric estimates (Chetty et 
al. 2011a, b), and the recent literature has investigated two main channels poten-
tially driving such a gap. First, work on social multipliers illustrates how social 
 interactions would magnify aggregate responses relative to individual behavior in 
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a range of contexts, including labor supply (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 
2003; Maurin and Moschion 2009). Second, recent studies on optimization frictions 
have shown that costs of adjusting working hours at the intensive margin attenuate 
micro elasticities relative to aggregate responses (Chetty et al. 2011a; Chetty 2012).
Our work contributes to the understanding of mechanisms underlying either 
channel and the interaction between them. Specifically, labor supply spillovers 
are substantially shaped in nature and magnitude by optimization frictions, inso-
far as the cost of adjusting working hours restricts spousal labor supply responses 
to workers who have fewer constraints in organizing their workweek, and to the 
nonusual component of their workweek. The resulting labor supply spillovers are 
thus strongly asymmetric, whereby women’s treatment affects male labor supply but 
not vice versa (with very few exceptions), and independent changes in usual work-
ing hours produce spillovers on nonusual hours, but not vice versa. Spillovers on 
 nonusual hours may in turn have an impact on productivity and profitability, while 
the absence of spillovers on usual hours would in most cases rule out an impact on 
current earnings. As optimization frictions in working hours are likely to bind in 
a variety of institutional contexts, the French case study considered here can shed 
light on the nature and magnitude of labor supply spillovers in other scenarios.
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on work-sharing policies in devel-
oped countries.2 The study which is closest to ours is Hunt (1998), who shows that 
the gradual decline in standard working hours of male employees between 1985 
and 1995 in Germany was not accompanied by changes in their wives’ employment 
rates, but by a small decline in their hours of work. This result, while consistent with 
complementarity in spousal leisure, may also reflect wives’ own gradual exposure to 
shorter standard workweeks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I gives an overview of the workweek 
reduction reform. Section II describes the data used and provides some graphic 
evidence. Section III presents our main regression results. Section IV addresses a 
number of caveats to a causal interpretation of our estimates. Section V provides 
instrumental variable estimates of cross-hour effects, using mandated workweek 
reductions as instruments for spousal labor supply. Section VI concludes.
I. Historical and Institutional Context
Since the early 1980s, the legal workweek duration in France has been 39 hours, 
accompanied by a 25  percent overtime wage premium and a 130 overtime hour 
limit per worker per year. This scenario was substantially changed in the late 1990s. 
In April 1997, the French president Jacques Chirac dissolved the parliament and 
called general elections one year ahead of the end of the legislature. This deci-
sion was highly unexpected and the electoral campaign that followed was very 
short. The socialist party proposed a program whose main axis was the reduction 
of  unemployment through work-sharing, with two basic slogans: “travailler moins 
pour travailler tous” (work less in order to work all) and “35 heures payées 39” 
(35 worked hours paid 39). The left coalition won the election in June 1997.
2 The employment effects of workweek reduction reforms in France are studied by Crépon and Kramarz (2002); 
Askenazy (2008); Estevao and Sa (2008); and Chemin and Wasmer (2009), among others.
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The workweek reduction was implemented in two steps (see Askenazy 2008, 
for a detailed description of the reform). The first law (Aubry I, after the then 
labor secretary Martine Aubry), passed in June 1998, set the legal workweek at 35 
hours in the private sector and mandated its implementation by January 2000 in 
firms with more than 20 employees, and by January 2002 in smaller firms.3 Hours 
worked beyond the thirty-fifth hour would be treated as overtime hours. Firms 
who would implement the shorter workweek through collective agreements with 
unions before the relevant deadline would benefit from substantial cuts in payroll 
taxes,4 provided that they committed to maintain employment levels. Finally, the 
law required that workers should not experience a drop in their monthly earn-
ings following the legal workweek reduction.5 In particular, firms who signed a 
35-hours agreement had to grant a specific (4 hours) bonus to workers paid the 
monthly minimum wage. The general purpose of the law was to induce firms to 
raise employment levels by work-sharing, while offering them fiscal advantages to 
attenuate detrimental impacts of work-sharing on profitability.
In January 2000, the second law (Aubry II) introduced a few amendments in order 
to limit the burden of the shorter workweek on employers. Specifically, with a slight 
redefinition of working time, it made it possible for employers to exclude “unpro-
ductive breaks” from the hours count, and thus achieve some reduction in the mea-
sure of working hours without changing work schedules. Also, it allowed firms to 
implement shorter hours on an annual—rather than weekly—basis, with a 1,600 
annual hour cap. This means that fiscal advantages could be obtained even with 
actual workweek reductions below 10 percent. Finally, the Aubry II law introduced 
a two-year transitional phase during which it was possible for employers to keep the 
39-hour workweek by using overtime at a reduced 10 percent rate.
Two years later, in summer 2002, the conservative party came back to power 
and, while the Aubry laws remained formally in place, the transition to the shorter 
workweek was discontinued in practice. The new government raised the maximum 
number of overtime hours from 130 to 220, and extended fiscal incentives to all 
firms, including those that did not sign workweek reduction agreements. In this new 
scenario firms could effectively have employees working 39 hours weekly, at no 
extra hourly cost with respect to the pre-reform scenario. Following these political 
changes, the 35-hour workweek was never fully implemented, especially in small 
private firms. Nevertheless, the Aubry laws have had a very large impact on the 
French economy, covering about 10 million workers by 2002.
In a nutshell, the French workweek reform had several important features: it was 
largely unexpected; it has been interrupted, with only a fraction of workers being 
affected; it did not affect monthly earnings; and given its gradual implementation it 
would likely not treat spouses in a given household at the same time. We build on 
these features of the reform in order to evaluate the effect of an exogenous variation 
in an employee’s workweek on the labor supply of her spouse.
3 There were no explicit deadlines set for firms in the public sector.
4 For workers paid at the minimum wage, the cuts imply a reduction of about 8 percent in total labor cost for 
five years.
5 As in principle there might be an income effect through overtime pay, we will illustrate in Section III the (lack 
of) earnings effects of the shorter workweek.
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II. Data and Descriptive Evidence
A. The Dataset
We combine individual level information on worker characteristics and working 
hours with firm level information on collective agreements signed by employers 
who adopted the shorter workweek. Individual level information comes from the 
French Labor Force Survey (LFS), which is conducted by the French Statistical 
Office, INSEE. Before 2003, the LFS was conducted in March of every year, and 
covered a representative sample of about 100,000 households each year (with a 
1/300 sampling rate). Since 2003, the survey is conducted each quarter and covers 
a representative sample of about 55,000 households each quarter. Our main analysis 
will be based on all repeated cross sections from 1994–2009, namely all annual 
surveys 1994–2002, and all first-quarter surveys for 2003–2009.
For each household member aged 15 or above, the LFS provides information on 
gender, marital status, employment status, occupation, education, industry, monthly 
earnings, and hours worked. We exploit information on both actual hours worked 
during the reference week (typically the week before the survey), and usual hours 
worked in a typical week. 6 Crucial for our purposes, our restricted use version of 
the LFS also provides coded employer identifiers.7 These allow us to match worker 
level information with firm level information from the DARES-URSSAF dataset, 
an administrative database collected by the French Ministry of Labor, which pro-
vides detailed information on all firms who signed a workweek reduction agree-
ment, including the signing and implementation dates. We thus obtain a matched 
employer-employee dataset containing information on working hours of respon-
dents and their spouses, as well as information on when, if ever, their employers 
implemented the shorter workweek. The matched employer-employee dataset used 
has some clear advantages compared to the non-matched LFS. First, it allows us 
to identify which workers were actually treated, and not simply the intention to 
treat based on the number of employees in their firms and the proximity to the law 
deadlines. Also, the information on the exact date of treatment makes it possible to 
exploit the gradual implementation of the shorter workweek, thus avoiding to solely 
rely on the announced 2000 and 2002 deadlines. Detailed information on the con-
struction of our dataset is provided in Goux, Maurin, and Petrongolo (2014).
In our analysis we select all married or cohabiting individuals aged 18–65, whose 
spouse is a wage earner, and we focus on the labor supply response of these indi-
viduals to their spouses’ exposure to the shorter workweek. We define treatment as 
6 According to the official International Labour Office (2002, p. 203) definition, usual hours represent “the modal 
value of the number of hours actually worked per week over a long period of time.” This definition is applicable to 
workers with regular schedules only (about 85 percent of cases in the LFS), and does not include irregular or unusual 
overtime, nor unusual absences or rest. French labor laws require contracts to be explicit about hours, pay, tasks, and 
paid leaves, and as a consequence interviewees would know precisely their normal hours as well as contractual changes 
in these. Moreover information in the LFS is collected through face-to-face interviews during which INSEE interview-
ers attempt to make sure that respondents understand questions and answer in a consistent way. This procedure consid-
erably reduces measurement error on hours of work relative to self-filled questionnaires (Baum-Snow and Neal 2009).
7 Each employee is asked to report the name and address of her employer, and this information is coded by 
INSEE. The coded employer identifier is available for just over 80 percent of the employees in the LFS. Most cases 
of missing employer ID correspond to very small firms. For a detailed description of the coding procedure, see 
Abowd and Kramarz (1999) or Goux and Maurin (1999).
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working for an employer who has signed a workweek reduction agreement,8 and 
we drop the small number of individuals whose spouses were treated either before 
1996 or after 2002, since these early and late agreements may not correspond to 
the reform implemented in the late 1990s. Our working sample includes 189,894 
males and 236,802 females. Descriptive statistics on these samples are provided in 
Table A1 and Figures A1 and A2 of the online Appendix.
To illustrate the timing of treatment, Figure 1 shows the gradual implementation 
of the shorter workweek on our sample. While only about 40 percent of employ-
ees are eventually treated, there is substantial variation in treatment dates between 
1998 and 2002. Table 1 reports the distribution of own and spousal treatment for 
employed respondents, and shows that about 54  percent of husbands of treated 
women are not treated themselves by the workweek reduction (panel A, column 2), 
while about 29 percent of husbands of non-treated women are treated. While there 
is some assortative mating along the treatment dimension, spouses have nonetheless 
different treatment status in a large proportion of cases. Furthermore, even when 
both spouses are treated, the timing of treatment differs for about half of the couples. 
Panel B shows a very similar picture for wives of treated and non-treated men. 
Information on exact agreement dates thus allows us to separately identify the direct 
and cross-effects of shorter workweeks across spouses, as in the majority of cases 
the year of treatment differs across spouses.
8 Note that we never use hours reported in the LFS to assign treatment status, but administrative information col-
lected independently by the Ministry of Labour. This prevents us from generating an artificial correlation between 
our indicator of treatment status and weekly hours.
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B. Graphical Evidence: Direct and Cross-Effect of Treatment
Before moving on to regression analysis, we provide simple graphical evidence 
on the direct and cross-effects of the workweek reform. Figure 2 plots actual hours 
worked during the survey week by wives who are wage earners, by treatment status. 
The solid line refers to treated wives, and time zero refers to the year in which a 
shorter workweek agreement is implemented at their workplace. Their weekly hours 
are stable, if anything slightly rising, during the pre-treatment years, and drop by about 
2 upon treatment. The dotted line refers to non-treated wives, and reports their work-
ing hours for the same dates at which treated wives are observed.9 Their weekly hours 
follow a gradually rising trend throughout the sample period, with no break at time 
zero. Thus we observe a decline of about two hours in working hours of treated wives 
relative to control wives at time of treatment. Interestingly, wives who become treated 
have longer weekly hours initially, and their hours converge almost exactly to hours 
of non-treated wives when their employers adopt the shorter workweek. Figure B1 
(panel A) in the online Appendix plots treatment-control  differences in these series, 
together with the corresponding confidence intervals, and shows flat pre-treatment 
differences, followed by a permanent, 2-hour drop in correspondence of treatment.
The observed drop in weekly hours for treated wives relative to the non-treated is 
a first-stage effect for the cross-hour effect on men that we intend to analyze next. A 
first-stage effect of about 2 hours is equivalent to roughly half the  reduction in the 
legal workweek (39 − 35 = 4), and this may be explained by a number of factors, 
9 For each treated individual i, we obtain the average number of hours worked by never treated individuals 
observed in the LFS in the same year as i, denoted by  H c(i) . For each D = −5, −4, … , +6, the dotted line in 
Figure 2 shows the average of  H c(i) over the population of treated individuals i observed at a distance D from treat-
ment (where D = year of observation − year of treatment).
Table 1—Distribution of Own Treatment, by Spouse’s Treatment (percent)
Wife not treated Wife treated
Panel A. Employed men
Own firm never adopted shorter workweek 71.0 54.2
Own firm adopted shorter workweek 29.0 45.8
 Not same year as wife’s firm 29.0 22.8
 Same year as wife’s firm — 23.0
Total 100 100
Husband not treated Husband treated
Panel B. Employed women
Own firm never adopted shorter workweek 73.2 58.1
Own firm adopted shorter workweek 26.8 41.9
 Not same year as wife’s firm 26.8 21.3
 Same year as wife’s firm — 20.6
Total 100 100
Notes: The sample includes employed respondents. The interpretation of figures is as follows: 
among employed males whose spouse works in a treated firm, 45.8 percent are working in a 
treated firm.
Source: French LFS, 1994–2009, INSEE.
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 including slight redefinitions of working time and/or the possibility to implement 
the worktime regulation at the annual rather than weekly level10 (see also Askenazy 
2008). This would deliver a mitigated effect of the workweek reduction on mean 
actual hours in the LFS, as the survey week falls in March of each year, and thus 
tends not to coincide with popular holiday seasons. Finally, the effect of the introduc-
tion of the 35-hour workweek has also been mitigated by the incidence of relatively 
short workweeks among French employees in the pre-reform period. Specifically, 
about 39 percent of females and 16 percent of males usually worked less than 39 
hours per week before treatment.11 The estimated 2-hour drop in working hours 
can thus be interpreted as an average of a higher drop for women initially working 
39 hours or more, and a smaller drop for those initially working less than 39 hours.
Given the behavior of treated wives, the next question is whether we observe a 
variation in either the employment rate or the number of hours worked by their hus-
bands. Figure 3 shows flat and virtually identical employment patterns of husbands 
of treated and non-treated wives. Figure 4 then addresses corresponding variations 
at the intensive margin, by showing the impact on hours worked by the subsample of 
employed men, and reveals a sizeable drop in hours worked by husbands of treated 
women, relative to husbands of non-treated women, at time of treatment. Specifically, 
the difference in working hours is close to zero during the five  pre-treatment 
years, and rises to 40 minutes on average during the five  post- treatment years. 
10 For example, an employer could cut the usual workweek to 37 hours and grant 12.5 additional days of annual 
leave. In treated firms, about 38 percent of male employees and 23 percent of female employees declare having 
usual workweeks longer than 35 hours after treatment.
11 Note that for some employees the reform was not even binding, as about 6.5 percent and 31 percent of men and 
women, respectively, had usual hours below or at 35 in the pre-treatment period. For women, short usual workweeks 
mostly correspond to part-time work. For men, they correspond mostly to specific jobs and working conditions 
(e.g., night work, evening work, Sunday work, rotating shift patterns, etc.).
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The  difference between the two series shows no evidence of differential pre-trends, 
and jumps permanently upon treatment (online Appendix Figure B2, panel A).
As the observed cross-effects might be partly induced by cases of simultane-
ous treatment of spouses, we replicate the corresponding trends on a subsample 
that excludes men treated at the same date as their wives, and on a subsample that 
excludes men ever treated, respectively. Reassuringly, Figures B3 and B4 in the 
online Appendix provide a very similar picture of cross-hour effects as Figure 4. In 
the regression analysis that follows we pool all households and control for own and 
spouse treatment separately.
Figures 5 to 7 repeat a similar analysis for female respondents and their hus-
bands. Again we observe a clear first-stage effect for husbands (Figure 5), whose 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
em
pl
oy
ed
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Year − year of treatment
Wife not treated
Wife treated
Figure 3. Men’s Employment Rates, by Wife’s Treatment
Figure 4. Men’s Hours Worked, by Wife’s Treatment
36
37
38
39
40
41
W
ee
kl
y 
ho
ur
s
−5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Year − year of treatment
Wife not treated
Wife treated
262 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JANuARy 2014
magnitude is very close to that observed for wives in Figure 2 (differences in these 
series are plotted in online Appendix Figure B1, panel B). However, we find no evi-
dence of spillover effects on their wives’ labor supply, either at the extensive margin 
(Figure 6), or the intensive margin (Figure 7). The difference between these series 
is essentially flat, and does not display any permanent jump upon treatment (online 
Appendix Figure B2, panel B).
The descriptive evidence presented is thus suggestive of labor supply spillovers at 
the intensive margin for men, but no spillovers at either margin for women. The next 
sections will show estimates of these effects that control for observable characteris-
tics of the individuals, and explore further the nature of these spillovers.
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III. Regression Results
A. Main Estimates
As in the previous descriptive analysis, we focus on two main outcome variables 
for each individual i in our sample, namely her employment status and her weekly 
hours worked, and assess how each is affected by the implementation of a shorter 
workweek agreement by her spouse’s employer. This would work via an effect on 
the spouse’s labor supply, and thus we start by estimating the first-stage effect of 
treatment on spouses. We denote by  H it S the actual weekly hours worked by the 
spouse, and introduce a dummy variable  A it S indicating whether at time t she works 
for a firm who has ever adopted the shorter workweek. Our first-stage regression is 
the following difference-in-differences specification:
(1)  H it S =  α 1 A it S +  α 2 APos t it S +  α 3  X it S +  D t +  u it ,
where APos t it S indicates the period following the introduction of the shorter work-
week in the spouse’s firm,  D t  denotes a set of year fixed effects, and  X it S are relevant 
individual covariates, including a constant term. The  α 2 coefficient shows the direct (first-stage) effect of workweek regulations on labor supply.
Table 2 shows the regression results for specification (1) for wives (panel A) and 
husbands (panel B). All reported standard errors in this and later tables are clustered 
at the year × treatment level (32 clusters). Column 1 in panel A shows that wives 
working in firms who implemented a workweek reduction agreement cut their labor 
supply by about 1.81 hours per week once the shorter workweek is implemented, as 
is also evident from Figure 2. Turning to husbands, column 1 in panel B shows again 
strong and significant effects of the workweek reduction (−1.95 hours). All these 
estimates are robust to the introduction of controls for age, education, and industry 
effects (column 2), suggesting that the implementation of the shorter workweek was 
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Figure 7. Women’s Hours Worked, by Husband’s Treatment
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largely orthogonal to these job and worker characteristics. Columns 3 and 4 in each 
panel report estimates of a similar specification for (the log of) monthly earnings, 
and once extra controls are included these show near zero effects of the workweek 
reduction on the earnings of wives and husbands. These first-stage results are clearly 
in line with the reform’s intended outcome to shorten the workweek without cutting 
monthly earnings of treated employees.
We next assess labor supply spillovers by looking at the reduced-form effects of 
one’s spouse’s workweek reduction on own employment status and weekly hours. 
Note that we can interpret such cross-effects as stemming from the sole reduction 
in the amount of time spent at work by the spouse once we have ruled out the pres-
ence of income effects, as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. Our reduced-form 
specification for hours is
(2)   H it =  γ 1 A it S +  γ 2 APos t it S +  γ 3 A it +  γ 4 APos t it +  γ 5 X it +  D t +  ε it ,
where  H it   denotes own weekly hours,  A it   is a dummy variable denoting whether 
one’s employer has ever implemented a shorter workweek agreement, whereas 
APos t it indicates the period following this agreement. The main coefficient of interest 
is  γ 2 . Note that this specification allows us to estimate cross-effects in labor supply (captured by APos t it S), over and above the direct effect of own treatment (captured 
by APos t it ). These two effects can be separately identified insofar as treatment is not 
simultaneous for all spouses. A similar linear specification to model (2) is used for 
Table 2—First-Stage Regressions:  
Direct Effects of the Shorter Workweek on Hours and Earnings
Wives’ hours Wives’ (log) earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Men
APos t S −1.81*** −1.91*** 0.002 −0.002
(0.13) (0.10) (0.010) (0.006)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. variable 30.05 30.05 8.658 8.658
Observations 189,894 189,894 160,046 160,046
Husbands’ hours Husbands’ (log) earnings
Panel B. Women
APos t S −1.95*** −1.92*** 0.017** 0.007
(0.13) (0.14) (0.008) (0.004)
Additional controls No Yes No Yes
Mean dep. variable 37.07 37.07 9.011 9.011
Observations 236,802 236,802 201,559 201,559
Notes: The table shows results from first-stage regressions for hours and earnings of spouses. 
Columns 1 and 2 refer to the full sample (married or cohabiting respondents whose spouse is 
an employee). Columns 3 and 4 refer to the subsample whose spouses have nonmissing earn-
ings (from 2003 onwards, information on earnings is collected on one-third of the LFS sam-
ple). Baseline controls include  A S , 15 year dummies, and a dummy for public sector. Additional 
controls include years of education, age, age squared, and 16 industry dummies. Standard 
errors clustered at the treatment × year level are reported in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: French LFS, 1994–2009, INSEE.
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the extensive margin, where the dependent variable is a dummy for the respondent’s 
employment status, and clearly  A it and APos t it are not defined.
The regression results are reported in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 refer to employ-
ment, and columns 3–6 refer to weekly hours. Estimates show no evidence of any 
significant cross-effects on employment for men, and the associated point esti-
mate is always very close to zero, in line with the trends reported in Figure 3. For 
women, the cross-effect on employment becomes marginally significant when fur-
ther controls are included in column 2, but its magnitude is negligible. As we find 
virtually no impact on employment, we next look at hours worked for those who 
are employed. In column 3 of panel A we regress men’s hours on own treatment 
( A it and APos t it ), and on their wives’ treatment ( A it S and APos t it S). The own treatment 
effect is about −2, and the cross-effect is −0.44 and highly significant, showing 
that when their wives become subject to the shorter workweek, men reduce their 
weekly labor supply by nearly half an hour. The magnitude of the cross-effect stays 
Table 3—Reduced-Form Regressions: Cross-Effects of the Shorter Workweek on Employment and Hours
Own employment Own hours (conditional on employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Men
APos t S −0.0037 −0.0028 −0.44*** −0.45*** −0.50*** −0.44***
(0.0027) (0.0022) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
APost — — −1.96*** −1.96*** −2.02*** —
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Further controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. variable 0.8819 0.8819 38.89 38.89 38.97 39.55
Observations 189,894 189,894 167,460 167,460 156,392 115,445
Own employment Own hours (conditional on employment)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel B. Women
APos t S −0.0032 −0.0041 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.07
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
APost −1.86*** −1.88*** −1.86*** —
(0.17) (0.15) (0.18)
Further controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Mean dep. variable 0.6786 0.6786 30.32 30.32 30.25 30.04
Observations 236,802 236,802 160,689 160,689 150,371 116,596
Notes: The table shows results from reduced-form regressions in which own employment status and hours are 
regressed on spousal treatment  A S ( and APos t S ), as well as on own treatment (A and APost). Columns 1 and 2 refer 
to the full sample. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the subsample of employed respondents. Column 5 refers to employed 
respondents who were not treated at the same time as their spouses. Column 6 refers to employed respondents who 
were never treated. Baseline controls in columns 1 and 2 include  A S , 15 year dummies, and spouse’s public sec-
tor dummy. Additional controls in column 2 are own years of education, age and age squared, and spouse’s years 
of education, age and age squared. Baseline controls in columns 3–6 include A,  A S , 15 year dummies, own public 
sector and wage-earner dummies, and a spouse’s public sector dummy. Additional controls in columns 4–6 include 
own years of education, age, age squared, and 16 industry dummies, and spouse’s years of education, age, age 
squared, and 16 industry dummies. Standard errors clustered at the treatment × year level are reported in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: French LFS, 1994–2009, INSEE.
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unchanged when we control for individual characteristics (column 4), and when we 
exclude men who are treated in the same year as their wives (column 5) or men who 
are ever treated (column 6). We next let the effect of treatment vary over time, and 
in particular we estimate a reduced-form specification that includes all controls as in 
column 4 of Table 3, having interacted  A it S with a full set of pre- and post-treatment 
dummies. The associated estimates are reported in Figure B5 (panel A) of the online 
Appendix, and show no pre-treatment effects, together with a permanent drop at 
time of treatment. In other words, post-treatment estimates are stable and all quite 
close to the overall treatment effect of −0.44.
Panel B of Table 3 reports corresponding estimates for women. While the own 
effect of workweek regulations is negative and significant, the cross-effect is posi-
tive, small, and not significantly different from zero. We thus detect no evidence of 
spousal spillovers in the labor supply of women.
We further explore cross-effects by estimating reduced-form specifications across 
the whole hours distribution. Specifically, for each k between 15 and 49, we estimate 
reduced-form equations for the probability of working longer than k hours. These 
coefficients are reported in Figure 8, together with the corresponding 95   percent 
confidence interval. For men, cross-effects on hours feature among the whole hours 
distribution, but most heavily for men working 35–38 hours, and this result replicates 
very closely on a subsample that excludes men ever treated (graph not reported). 
For women, cross-effects are much weaker and typically not statistically significant 
across the entire distribution, but if anything they involve a slight reduction in the 
incidence of long workweeks (40 ≤ H ≤ 45).
B. Further Estimates: Cross-Effects on Usual and Nonusual Working Hours
We next investigate the nature of labor supply spillovers in further detail by com-
bining information on actual hours (H) with information—also contained in the 
LFS—on usual hours ( H u ), defined as the number of hours worked in a typical 
week. Actual hours H are the sum of the usual workweek  H u and a nonusual labor 
supply component H −  H u , which may be either positive or negative, depending on 
whether overtime hours exceed various forms of “undertime” hours (e.g., unusually 
short working days, sickness absence, paid or unpaid leaves, etc.) in a given week.12 
A worker may reduce weekly hours H by either negotiating a new contract with her 
employer, involving lower  H u , or keeping her contract unchanged, together with the 
associated  H u , but cutting on H −  H u , and namely some form of work involvement 
that is typically not specified in a contract. This may imply a reduction in overtime 
work or an increase in the take-up rate of leaves or in absenteeism. It is reasonable 
to expect that cross-effects mostly occur through reductions in H −  H u , since these 
would not require the renegotiation of one’s labor contract, and are more easily 
under an employee’s individual control than adjustments in  H u . On the other hand, 
12 Note that H and  H u represent weekly-aggregated measures, thus someone who works one hour longer than the 
typical workday for three days in a week and one hour shorter for the remaining two days would have H >  H u . For 
simplicity, we will refer to cases in which H >  H u as cases of overtime work, and to cases in which H <  H u   as cases 
of undertime. Descriptive statistics on overtime and undertime are reported in Section D of the online Appendix.
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the direct effect of the law is expected to bite on  H u , consistently with the collective 
nature of these agreements.
Estimates reported in Table 4 shed light on these adjustment margins. The sample 
period is now restricted to 1994–2002, as information on usual hours is unavailable 
from 2003 onwards. Estimates in panel A refer to men. Columns 1 and 2 show that, 
as  anticipated, the first-stage effect of the workweek reduction in their wives’ firms 
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Figure 8. Estimated Cross-Effects on the Cumulative Distribution of Hours
Notes: For each k between 15 and 49, the solid lines show the cross-effect on the probability 
of working longer than k, i.e., Pr (H > k). Dashed lines show the corresponding 95 percent 
confidence intervals.
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mostly bites on usual hours (−1.75), while the effect on nonusual hours is much 
weaker (−0.54). By contrast, columns 3 and 4 show that the reduced-form effect of 
the reform on own hours works entirely via a reduction in nonusual hours (−0.62), 
with no cross-effect on usual hours (−0.05), and thus no need to renegotiate own 
work schedules for men responding to their wives’ work schedules. For women 
(panel B), we detect very similar first-stage effects as for men, but a small, albeit 
positive, cross-effect on  H u (0.17).
Changes in nonusual hours and earnings are further explored in Table  5. 
Columns 1 and 2 report cross-hour effects on overtime hours and undertime hours 
separately. These are defined as  ( H −  H u ) + = max ( H −  H u ,0 ) and  ( H −  H u ) − = max ( H u − H,0 ) , respectively. Cross-hour effects feature strongly on  undertime 
hours (0.54), while overtime hours are hardly affected (−0.07). Cross-effects on 
undertime hours in turn involve an increase in the frequency of both unworked 
weeks (H = 0, column  3) and unusually short workweeks (0 < H <  H u , 
 column 4), but no change at all in full-time status (column 5). For cases in which 
H <  H u ,  respondents are asked whether they worked less than usual in the reference 
week due to holidays and absence for personal reasons, sickness leave, maternity 
leave, continuous training, unusual workload, strike, or lock-out. While we detected 
significant cross-hour effects for holidays and sickness leaves, which are margins on 
Table 4—First-Stage and Reduced-Form Regressions: Direct and Cross-Effects  
of the Shorter Workweek on Usual and Nonusual Hours
First-stage Reduced-form
Wife’s usual 
hours  H u 
Wife’s  
actual-usual 
hours H −  H u 
Own usual  
hours  H u 
Own 
actual-usual 
hours H −  H u (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Men
APos t S −1.75*** −0.54*** −0.05 −0.62***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.05) (0.14)
Mean dep. var. 33.79 −4.46 39.24 −3.17
Observations 97,470 97,470 97,470 97,470
First-stage Reduced-form
Husband’s usual 
hours  H u 
Husband’s 
actual-usual 
hours H −  H u 
Own usual  
hours  H u 
Own 
actual-usual 
hours H −  H u (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B. Women
APos t S −2.02*** −0.46 0.17** 0.06
(0.12) (0.23) (0.08) (0.10)
Mean dep. var. 39.17 −3.18 33.33 −4.28
Observations 102,123 102,123 102,123 102,123
Notes: Regressions refer to the employed subsample with nonmissing own and spouse’s usual 
hours. Control variables in columns 1 and 2 are the same as in column 2 of Table 2, and in col-
umns 3 and 4 they are the same as in column 4 of Table 3. Standard errors clustered at the treat-
ment × year level are reported in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: French LFS, 1994–2002, INSEE.
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which employees have closer control, we found no evidence of cross-effects on any 
other margin (results not reported).13
Finally, we do not find any detrimental cross-effect on male earnings (column 6), 
consistently with evidence on the contribution of various components of actual hours 
(usual, overtime and undertime, respectively) to monthly earnings, as illustrated in 
Table C1 in the online Appendix. Interestingly, undertime hours turn out to be the sole 
component of labor supply that men may cut unilaterally without earning losses.
No hours margin is significantly affected for women (panel B), except the inci-
dence of part-time work, which falls by nearly 1 percentage point. The slight increase 
in the usual workweek and the corresponding change in full-time status are accom-
panied by an increase in earnings (2 percent), in line with the fact that usual hours are 
the labor supply component that best predicts earnings (online Appendix Table C1).
In summary, we detect substantial differences in both the magnitude and nature 
of spillover effects across genders. Specifically, cross-effects do not entail the rene-
gotiation of usual hours with employers or changes in earnings for men, but involve 
instead a reduction in their unusual work involvement, whether within a given day, 
or through an increase in the take-up rate of paid vacation or sick leave, with no 
detrimental impact on (current) earnings. A reason why men may work some unpaid 
hours in the first place is that these may have an impact on future, as opposed to 
 current, earnings, to the extent that someone who is more absent from work may 
13 Information on the take-up rate of paid leaves and paid and unpaid overtime work contained in later waves 
of the LFS (2003–2009) confirms that there exists significant leeway for most employees, and especially for the 
 high-skilled, in reducing their unpaid involvement at work.
Table 5—Reduced-Form Regressions: Cross-Effects  
of the Shorter Workweek on Types of Hours Worked and Earnings
Own
overtime
hours 
(H −  H U ) + 
Own
undertime 
hours 
(H −  H U ) − 
Own
unworked 
weeks 
H = 0
Own 
unusually short 
workweeks 
0 < H <  H U 
Own 
part-time
Own
(log)
earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Men
APos t S −0.07 −0.54*** 0.012*** 0.006** −0.002 0.002
(0.03) (0.11) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Mean dep. var. 0.86 −4.03 0.088 0.065 0.031 9.004
Observations 97,470 97,470 97,470 97,470 97,470 97,470
Panel B. Women
APos t S −0.06 0.12 −0.005 0.005 −0.012*** 0.020***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Mean dep. var. 0.56 −4.84 0.129 0.061 0.323 8.587
Observations 102,123 102,123 102,123 102,123 102,123 102,123
Notes: Regressions refer to the employed subsample with nonmissing own and spouse’s usual hours. Control vari-
ables are the same as in column 4 of Table 3. In column 2, the interpretation of positive coefficients is that the fall in 
labor supply is now picked up by an increase in undertime hours. Standard errors clustered at the treatment × year 
level are reported in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: French LFS, 1994–2002, INSEE.
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lose on prospects of promotion and/or earnings growth. Another possible explana-
tion is that some individuals may derive utility from work per se. Regardless of 
the underlying mechanism, our results show that men decide to cut on such unpaid 
hours following their wives’ treatment, as increased spousal non-market time would 
raise the utility of their own non-market time relative to the utility of being at work.
Women, by contrast, are more often working part-time and less often spending 
unpaid, nonusual hours at work. Compared to men, it is on average more costly 
for women to adjust hours downward, insofar as they have lower nonusual hours 
margins than men, but less costly to adjust hours upward, as in the public sector 
and large private sector firms employees can easily shift from part-time to full-time 
status, and only among women is the incidence of part-time work substantial. The 
French reform thus provides a clean example of the role of optimization frictions in 
shaping the magnitude and nature of social spillovers.
C. Heterogeneous Cross-Hour Effects
As working hours, constraints, and preferences may vary widely across individu-
als, cross-hour effects may differ across occupations and the household composition 
of workers. Workers in high-skill occupations (managers, professionals, and associ-
ate occupations) on average work longer hours than the less-skilled and typically 
have higher control over the organization of their workweek, while the less-skilled 
are more likely to work the legal workweek and thus would only be able to cut their 
working hours via new contractual agreements.
Panels A and B in Table  6 replicate our previous analysis on actual hours for 
employees in high-skill occupations and other employees, respectively. First-stage 
effects reported in column  1 have conventional magnitude and significance. For 
men, the associated cross-effect on hours is about three times larger for high-skill 
occupations (column 2) than for other occupations (column 3). Similar conclusions 
can be drawn by looking at the probability of working more than 45 hours weekly 
(columns 3 and 6). Spillover effects on men’s labor supply thus seem much stronger 
for the high-skilled than for the less-skilled.14 For women, we do not find significant 
cross-effects on overall working hours, but we do find a negative and significant 
impact on the probability that females in high-skill occupations work long weeks. 
This is the only subsample and only outcome variable for which we detect sym-
metric cross-effects for men and women. We found in Section IIIA that women 
are slightly less likely to work very long hours when their husbands are treated 
(Figure 8), and we note here that for female managers and professionals this effect 
is as strong as for men, suggesting that when women have enough leeway to cut 
their hours—either because they work very long hours in the first place or they have 
managerial control—their labor supply response is qualitatively similar to that of 
men. However, the subsample of such women is too small, and their labor supply 
response too weak, for this effect to be discernible on the full sample.
14 In the online Appendix, we also show that cross-effects for men are stronger in the public than in the private 
sector, consistently with the presumption that public employees in France tend to have, other things equal, greater 
control than private employees in organizing their working time (see Table D1, panel A).
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Table 6—Heterogeneous Effects of the Shorter Workweek, by Occupation and Family Type
Managers, profs., and kindred occup. Other occupations
First-stage Reduced-form First-stage Reduced-form
Wife’s hours
(1)
Own hours
(2)
Own hours 
≥ 45
(3)
Wife’s hours
(4)
Own hours
(5)
Own hours 
≥ 45
(6)
Panel A. Men
APos t S −2.32*** −0.81*** −0.033*** −1.72*** −0.32*** −0.006***
(0.30) (0.27) (0.009) (0.11) (0.09) (0.002)
Mean dep. var 29.80 40.91 0.447 30.20 38.44 0.217
Observations 30,432 30,432 30,432 137,028 137,028 137,028
Managers, profs., and kindred occup. Other occupations
First-stage Reduced-form First-stage Reduced-form
Husband’s 
hours
(1)
Own 
hours
(2)
Own hours 
≥ 45
(3)
Husband’s 
hours
(4)
Own 
hours
(5)
Own hours 
≥ 45
(6) 
Panel B. Women
APos t S −2.51*** −0.17 −0.034*** −2.03*** 0.15 −0.001
(0.40) (0.34) (0.008) (0.13) (0.11) (0.002)
Mean dep. var 38.51 32.03 0.196 36.91 30.14 0.069
Observations 15,217 15,217 15,217 145,472 145,472 145,472
At least one child aged 0−6 No children aged 0−6
First-stage Reduced-form First-stage Reduced-form
Wife’s hours
(1)
Own hours
(2)
Own hours 
≥ 45
(3)
Wife’s hours
(4)
Own hours
(5)
Own hours 
≥ 45
(6)
Panel C. Men
APos t S −1.30*** −0.81*** −0.028*** −2.08*** −0.34*** −0.003
(0.23) (0.28) (0.008) (0.13) (0.12) (0.003)
Mean dep. var 27.53 38.85 0.260 30.93 38.91 0.259
Observations 39,468 39,468 39,468 127,992 127,992 127,992
At least one child aged 0−6 No children aged 0−6 
First-stage Reduced-form First-stage Reduced-form
Husband’s 
hours
(1)
Own 
hours
(2)
Own hours 
≥ 45
(3)
Husband’s 
hours
(4)
Own 
hours
(5)
Own hours 
≥ 45
(6) 
Panel D. Women
APos t S −2.25*** 0.49 −0.001 −2.04*** −0.08 −0.005**
(0.24) (0.25) (0.003) (0.11) (0.10) (0.002)
Mean dep. var 37.16 27.94 0.063 37.03 31.03 0.086
Observations 36,959 36,959 36,959 123,730 123,730 123,730
Notes: Regressions refer to the employed subsample. In columns 1 and 4, control variables are the same as in col-
umn 4 of Table 3, and in columns 2, 3, 5, 6 they are the same as in column 4 of Table 4. Standard errors clustered at 
the treatment × year level are reported in brackets. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: French LFS, 1994–2009, INSEE.
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We further explore spousal labor supply responses across household types. It has 
been argued that interdependences in spousal labor supply may be stronger in the 
presence of young children, as children appear to play the role of a jointly-consumed 
commodity for husbands and wives (Lundberg 1988). Panels C and D of Table 6 
cover households with at least one child aged 0–6, and other households separately. 
We find weaker first-stage effects for mothers of young children than for other women, 
in line with higher incidence of part-time work among mothers, as for part-timers 
the mandatory workweek reduction is not necessarily binding. Reduced-form regres-
sions show a much stronger labor supply reaction for fathers of young kids than other 
men, despite a weaker first stage. For women, cross-effects are somewhat mixed, as 
we detect a positive, rather than negative, cross-hour effect for mothers of young kids, 
and a negative cross-effect on the probability to work long weeks for other women.
IV. Robustness Analysis
The identifying assumption underlying our main estimates is that a respondent’s 
unobserved characteristics be uncorrelated to the timing of adoption of the shorter 
workweek in his or her spouse’s firm. One may think of scenarios in which this 
assumption is potentially violated, and we perform a number of robustness tests that 
should address various caveats to a causal interpretation of our estimates.
First, one should worry about the existence of differential pre-existing trends in 
working hours between treatment and control groups. However, the event-study 
type of evidence presented in Figures 2–7 clearly shows that this is not the case, as 
pre-trends are in all cases parallel or even flat. This is also confirmed by estimates 
of reduced-form specifications that control for treatment-specific trends, reported in 
columns 1 and 4 of Table E1 in the online Appendix. Columns 3 and 6 in Table E1 
further control for region × year interactions, capturing the effect of local shocks, 
and show virtually unchanged estimates from columns 1 and 4, respectively.
Second, our identifying assumption would be violated if spouses of employees in 
firms adopting the shorter workweek were subject to systematically different shocks 
or changes in unobservables around time of adoption, versus spouses of employees in 
non-adopting firms. If changes in unobservables of treatment and control groups would 
generate spurious changes to their labor supply, one would possibly expect to observe 
some change in some of their observables as well around the time of treatment. But 
online Appendix Table E2 shows no evidence of any significant change in such char-
acteristics upon treatment. Third, we take into account concerns of reverse causality, 
namely the possibility that changes in own labor supply behavior may affect spousal 
job mobility between adopting and non-adopting firms, and replicate our reduced-form 
specifications on a subsample of spouses of job-stayers (online Appendix, page 5).
Finally, one may worry that in general employees in adopting (or early-adopting) 
firms would have systematically different spouses from employees in non-adopting 
(or late-adopting) firms. To address this concern, we provide fixed-effect estimates 
of the effects of interest, based on a (limited) rotating panel component of the LFS 
(online Appendix Table E4). This last robustness test confirms our main estimates.15
15 We also checked that our estimates are very similar whether identification only relies on variation in hours 
across treated and non-treated spouses, or across early and late-treated spouses (Section E.2 in the online Appendix).
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V. Instrumental Variable Estimates of Cross-Hour Effects
There is a long standing tradition of labor supply models in which the decisions of 
each spouse depend on the number of hours spent at work by the other spouse (see 
Lundberg 1988, for a seminal example). These models are hard to estimate as they 
involve a system of two simultaneous equations in which wives’ hours feature in the 
husbands’ labor supply equation and vice versa, and good instruments for indepen-
dent variation in the labor supply of one of the spouses are typically hard to find. In 
such a scenario the French workweek reform helps identify the effects of interest by 
generating exogenous variation in the labor supply of one’s spouse.
While the previous sections have highlighted the reduced-form effect of work-
week regulations on spousal labor supply, in this section we use workweek regula-
tions in an individual’s firm as an instrument for her working hours in her spouse’s 
labor supply equation. Under the exclusion restriction that workweek regulations 
affect spousal labor supply only via their effect on the labor supply of directly treated 
employees, IV estimates provide the parameter of interest for measuring how labor 
supply responds to independent changes in labor supply of one’s spouse, and may 
be generalized to a variety of scenarios.
The structural interpretation of this parameter, as well as of its variation across gen-
ders, relies on the underlying model of intra-household interactions, and in particular 
on whether one assumes the household decision making process to be cooperative 
or non-cooperative. In non-cooperative models (see for instance, Bourguignon 1984; 
Chen and Woolley 2001; Lechene and Preston 2011), each spouse maximizes an indi-
vidual utility function, taking the decisions of the other spouse as given. The argu-
ments of such utility functions may include own as well as spousal use of time. In 
this framework cross-hour effects represent the effect of spousal labor supply on the 
marginal utility of substituting time spent at work with leisure. Asymmetric cross-hour 
effects can be easily generated in this context by different utility functions for men 
and women, such that men’s utility of leisure would respond to wives’ leisure, but not 
vice versa. In cooperative household models (see, among others, McElroy and Horney 
1981; Chiappori 1988; Apps and Rees 1988), the household jointly maximizes a util-
ity function, strictly increasing in the utility of each spouse. In this case it can be 
shown that estimated cross-hour effects for men and women stem from the same set 
of parameters in spouses’ utility functions and, consequently, strongly asymmetric 
cross-hour effects for men and women are less straightforward to rationalize, unless 
women are initially trapped at a corner solution characterized by zero unpaid time at 
work (see detailed discussion in Section F of the online Appendix).
Below we report estimates of the impact of spousal hours on own hours, having 
instrumented spousal hours by APos t S . The regression results are reported in Table 7 
for men (panel A) and women (panel B), using the same samples and specifications 
as in Tables 3 and 6. Among men, the average cross-hour effect in labor supply is 
0.23, but about twice as large for managers and professionals than for other occupa-
tions. When their wives cut their labor supply by one hour, men in high occupations 
respond by cutting their own labor supply by about 20 minutes. Also, cross-effects 
are three times larger in the presence of young children, relative to other households. 
The quantitative response for fathers is about 35 minutes for each extra hour spent 
at home by their wives, suggesting that worktime policy evaluations restricted to 
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direct labor supply effects may strongly underestimate its impact on the time spent 
by fathers with their young children. For women we detect no significant cross-hour 
effect on the whole sample or across the occupational divide, but we do find a nega-
tive, marginally significant cross-effect for mothers of young kids.
These estimates can be used to quantitatively evaluate the social multiplier, 
i.e., the gap between aggregate and individual effects of a labor supply shock. 
Macroeconomic calibrations existing in the literature typically imply much higher 
labor supply elasticities than individual-level estimates (Chetty et al. 2011a, b), and 
spousal labor supply complementarities represent an important channel for such a 
gap. Our estimates reveal a strongly asymmetric structure of spillovers, whereby 
women’s treatment affects male labor supply but not vice versa (with very few 
exceptions). Specifically, an average cross-hour effect of 0.23 for husbands and a 
negligible one for wives means that a unit change in individual hours translates 
into a change in household labor supply of 2.23. This implies a macro response 
that is 2.23/2 − 1 = 11.5 percent higher than the micro response for the average 
 household. As discussed by Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003), the role 
of social interactions and social multipliers may vary widely across demographic 
groups and levels of aggregation, and the French workweek reform provides a clean 
experiment to identify the multiplier in labor supply at the household level.
Finally, our findings on specific margins of adjustments of weekly hours reveal 
that, due to search frictions and hours constraints, it is mostly nonusual hours that 
respond to spouse treatment, leaving usual hours largely unchanged. Thus the above 
estimates of the social multiplier are likely attenuated by optimization frictions, and 
may be interpreted as a lower bound for macro elasticities that one would observe 
absent frictions (Chetty et al. 2011a, Chetty 2012).
Table 7—IV Estimates of Cross-Hour Effects
Own hours
All High-skilled
Other
occupation
One or more
child 0–6
Other
households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Employed men
Wife’s hours 0.23*** 0.34*** 0.18*** 0.59*** 0.16***
(0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.21) (0.06)
Mean dep. variable 38.89 40.91 38.44 38.85 38.91
Observations 167,460 30,432 137,028 39,468 127,992
Panel B. Employed women
Husband’s hours −0.02 0.08 −0.07 −0.23 0.04
(0.05) (0.13) (0.06) (0.12) (0.05)
Mean dep. variable 30.32 32.03 30.14 27.94 31.03
Observations 160,689 15,217 145,472 36,959 123,730
Notes: Regressions refers to the employed subsample. Estimates reported show the effect of spousal hours ( H S ) 
on own hours (H), using spousal treatment (APos t S ) as an instrument. The corresponding reduced-form results are 
reported in Tables 3 and 6. Further controls include A, APost,  A S , 15 year dummies, a wage-earner dummy and the 
following variables for each spouse: a public sector dummy, years of education, age, age squared, and 16 industry 
dummies. Standard errors clustered at the treatment × year level are reported in brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
Source: French LFS, 1994–2009, INSEE.
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VI. Conclusions
We have investigated cross-hour effects in the labor supply of couples using indepen-
dent variation in spousal hours generated by changes in worktime regulations. In par-
ticular we exploit independent variation in spousal hours at constant monthly earnings, 
which allows us to abstract from income effects of changes in spousal labor supply, 
and focus on pure cross-hour effects. While wives of treated men hardly adjust their 
working time, husbands of treated women respond by cutting their workweek by about 
half an hour to one hour, according to specifications and samples. Such gender differ-
ences in cross-hour effects are remarkable; especially insofar as women’s labor supply 
elasticity is typically higher than men’s (Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). These results 
suggest significant spousal complementarities in leisure time for men. While we do not 
find strong evidence on different preferences by gender, insofar as women work shorter 
hours in the first place and are less likely than men to have managerial control, they 
may be more heavily constrained in the organization of their working time.
Our results on cross-hour effects are noteworthy as they show that neglecting 
spousal responses may give a misleading view of the overall impact of labor sup-
ply shocks. In particular, evaluations restricted to the direct impact of policy on the 
targeted population are likely to underestimate its overall effect on labor supply. A 
simple back-of-envelope calculation suggests a social multiplier around 1.11, thus 
neglecting spillovers within the household would yield an underestimate of the over-
all policy impact on labor supply by about 11 percent. Finally, cross-hour effects vary 
widely across household types, and tend to be strongest in the presence of young 
children, with policy relevant effects on the time spent by fathers with their offspring.
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